Abstract-Unmanned aircraft system (UAS) technologies have gained immense popularity in the commercial sector and have enabled capabilities that were not available just a short time ago. Once limited to the domain of highly skilled hobbyists or precision military instruments, consumer UAS are now widespread due to increased computational power, manufacturing techniques, and numerous commercial applications. The rise of consumer UAS and the low barrier to entry necessary to utilize these systems provides an increased potential for using a UAS as a delivery platform for malicious intent. This creates a new security concern which must be addressed. The contribution presented in this work is the realization of counter UAS security technology concepts viewed through the traditional security framework and the associated challenges to such a framework.
I. INTRODUCTION
The domain of counter unmanned aircraft systems (CUAS) remains a speculative, emerging space in both government and industry. Due to the rapidly changing unmanned aircraft system (UAS) capability and increasing availability, a strong need for an equivalent CUAS program is required. UAS represent a fundamentally distinct challenge for security in ways that past threats have not; there are no known practical delay techniques, UAS move in all three dimensions, a person of limited technical background can construct, operate, and execute complex tasks with minimal skill, UAS can attain very high speeds, and UAS can be designed to carry payloads of notable weight.
In addition to these current capabilities, UAS are rapidly changing as commercial markets push for longer flight times, heavier payloads, and more autonomy. Future UAS capabilities will likely increase exponentially as major commercial companies have identified the cost-savings and increased revenue available from autonomy technology. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is projecting 7 million small drones to be occupying U.S. airspace by 2020 [1] . The collection of these new and rapidly changing threat capabilities requires a re-evaluation of traditional security design processes.
II. SECURITY DESIGN PROCESSES
Security system design methodologies are extensive, but primarily constructed around protection against well defined 978-1-5386-7931-9/18/$31.00 ©2018 IEEE targets and activities, such as human penetration into a facility. The Design and Evaluations Process Outline (DEPO) developed by Sandia National Laboratories, is one such methodology for designing and analyzing a physical protection system (PPS). DEPO is a systematic approach consisting of three major steps, which iterate until the PPS yields acceptable results [2] . The primary elements within this process include: 1) Determine requirements of the PPS with consideration for site operation and safety. 2) Design and characterize the PPS in terms of detection, delay, and response. The goal is a balanced and robust system. 3) Analysis: Quantify both component and overall PPS performance.
However, new targets such as UAS and associated CUAS technologies do not have a deeply established history within traditional PPSs, and therefore require preliminary analysis before the traditional DEPO process can be utilized. These primary tasks for CUAS, shown in Figure 1 , are discussed further in this work.
III. DETERMINE PPS OBJECTIVES

A. Facility Characterization
It is essential that the facility being protected is understood fully in terms of physical conditions, operations, legality, and its surrounding environment. Knowing the physical conditions such as site boundaries, building locations, and existing physical protection features within a complex is key. CUAS is unique in that most sites do not have an integrated PPS system built to detect, delay, or respond to UAS threats. If a site does have a CUAS technology, it is usually separate from the existing infrastructure and requires additional manpower to operate and maintain. UAS also complicate the issue of site boundaries. Site boundaries have traditionally been defined as a two-dimensional paradigm that that could use components such as barriers, doors, and fences to mitigate threats of interest. UAS mobility in all three dimensions thus elevates the site boundary to extend to three dimensions.
Several challenges in both technical and legal domains emerge under this new paradigm. The most visible and complex aspect of facility characterization is the legal issues that should be considered when designing and implementing a PPS. The FAA includes UAS under a law that states "United States jurisdiction over aircraft sabotage to include destruction of any aircraft in the special aircraft jurisdiction of the United States" [3] . In short, this law makes shooting down a UAS a federal crime in the United States.
Lastly, knowing what kind of environments are near your site can drastically change how you perceive a UAS. Responses could vary significantly depending upon the surrounding population density; UAS would likely be expected in a dense urban location and response may require more indications of negative intent compared to scenarios where a UAS is detected in a rural location.
B. Threat Defining
A design basis threat (DBT) is used as a management and design tool to help decision-making executives and establish technical requirements for designers. Knowing the capability of an adversary can greatly impact the DBT. For example, knowing the number of UAS intruders, if these UAS carry a payload, what make and model of the UAS, estimated flight time, or if the pilot has insider information would greatly assist in determining the severity of threat imposed by a UAS.
An adversary can use UAS for a wide array of actions, Cansler et al. [4] has identified several potential and/or proven cases where UAS have been used to carry out adversary actions.
1) Trespassing -In July 2015 a government employee told the Secret Services that he lost control of a small recreational drone before it crashed on the White House Lawn. It is illegal to fly in the restricted air space above and around the White House, and the complex was put under lock-down until the device was examined and cleared [5] . While in this example the pilot did not have any adversarial motives, this was still trespassing into a restricted zone. In July 2016, UAS were spotted over the Savannah River Site (SRS). Eight UAS were spotted by the protective force and professional staff at the facility. The incident triggered an investigation by federal agencies [6] . The reason for the UAS flights and who operated them is currently unknown. While these are just a few incidents that did not result in known harm, the potential threats include: a goal of disruption, damage to employees, operational interference, and a waste of resources [4] . 2) Surveillance Incidents -U.S. Customs and Border Control have noted how criminals are now using UAS to watch Border Control officers to identify gaps and radio to their counterparts where to go to avoid being arrested.
Other criminal organizations have begun using UAS to survey police departments for witness intimidation schemes to see who might be working with the police [7] . Potential threats include the goal of intelligence collection, adversary information gathering, corporate or political espionage. Reconnaissance technologies include quiet/high altitude flight capability, audio, visible video, thermal video, LIDAR, and electronic cyber sniffing [4] . 3) Event Disruption Incidents -In July 2018, Greenpeace activists crashed a superman shaped UAS into the wall of a French nuclear site. The UAS was harmless but was able to enter into the facility without resistance. The state-controlled company operating the nuclear facility is planning on filing a police complaint in response to the incident [8] .
In the winter of 2017 the FBI's Hostage Rescue Team was thwarted by a swarm of UAS. The FBI had set up an observation post to assess an unfolding situation, when UAS started making a series of high-speed low passes at the agents, essentially blinding them [7] . While many of the details of this incident are not public, the technology of UAS swarms and their relative ease of use heighten the need for better CUAS technologies. Potential threats include the goal of disruption, direct/indirect interruption, and unauthorized broadcast [4] . 4) Cyber Espionage Incidents -In Singapore 2014, during the security conference, Black Hat, which provides security consulting, training, and briefings, a security firm, SensePot unveiled its Snoopy UAS. This particular UAS has software integrated in that can be used to hack smartphones and steal the users personal data exploiting the wireless signal. Developers were able to demonstrate this functionality to attendees by pulling data and from hundreds of conference attendees and presenting it to them. While this technology is not necessarily new, combining the software to a UAS gives many more delivery options to hackers, including covering large areas, and entering facilities that a person with a laptop could not easily enter [9] . Potential threats include the goal of intelligence collection, illegal corporate competition exploitation, and criminal agents. Methodologies include hiding drones in inaccessible locations, and electronic eavesdropping with Wi-Fi and cellular snooping [4] . 5) Contraband Delivery Incidents -On July 29, 2015 a drone was used to deliver contraband to Mansfield Correctional Institute. The drone flew over the yard and dropped the package. The package was picked up by an unwitting inmate causing a brawl between more than 200 inmates [10] . Two years later, in December of 2017, ten men were found guilty of smuggling drugs into a prison in Worcestershire, England. The group was convicted of organizing 49 drone flights with an estimated 1.3 million dollars worth of prohibited items [11] . While these are only a few of the multiple incidents, the rise in the number of incidents and the scale suggests a growing trend. Potential threats include smuggling contraband such as phones, narcotics, weapons, or even satellite television [4] . 6) Weapon/Payload Attack -On September 2011, a man was arrested and charged with plotting to attack the Pentagon and the U.S. Capitol using UAS. Undercover investigations led the FBI to the man, who then supplied him with fake C-4 explosives and non-functional rifles and grenades [12] . This incident, though not successful, shows how a person of limited technical background could become a threat. For the first time since the Korean War 65 years ago, U.S. ground forces are under attack from enemy aircrafts. These systems are small quadcopter UAS essentially acting as grenades. In a single month during the Battle of Mosul, enemies flew over 300 UAS missions with about one-third being armed strike missions [13] . Potential threats include hostile intention, state actor attack, terrorism, and swarm attacks with multiple drones [4] .
C. Asset Identification
It is not possible or practical to protect all assets within a facility. A criteria for selecting items to protect depends on the undesirable consequences to be prevented, identifying the critical assets that require protection, and knowing where these assets are located in the facility will change how the PPS is designed to protected against UAS.
IV. CUAS SELECTION PROCESS
Prior to doing a PPS design, a CUAS technology needs to be selected to meet desired performance per the facility DBT. A credible, consistent, and comparable T&E methodology that can be leveraged by industry, academia, and government agencies is necessary to effectively select a CUAS technology for a PPS. This T&E methodology will help identify CUAS capability gaps that require further technology development to meet the security needs for critical infrastructure.
A. Life-Cycle
Technology Readiness Levels (TRL) range from basic research (TRL 1) to an evaluated and certified system (TRL 9). Figure 2 shows the life-cycle phases of CUAS technology along with the corresponding TRL. The majority of CUAS devices are still relatively low in TRL, primarily residing in phase 2, but are being implemented due to the emerging nature of CUAS and the need to field elements capable of mitigating UAS at any level.
Once at the analysis stage of this process, the component and overall CUAS PPS performance will be evaluated and given a TRL level. If this TRL level is not higher than the approval for use phase in the life-cycle, the PPS is deemed not acceptable and the design process will loop back to providing enhancements and redesigns necessary to correct for system inadequacies. Re-evaluation of existing CUAS systems should also be done on a regular bases, as both targets and threats adapt and change rapidly in this emerging space. 
1) Research & Development Technology Development -
While industry is developing CUAS technologies that address the current threat. Academia and/or national laboratories investigate higher risk, far reaching research that addresses emerging threats as well as future threats, leveraging their resources, capabilities, modeling, and expertise. Often far leaning low TRL, this technology aides the commercial industry, and usually span multiple year efforts. 2) Research & Development Prototype -When the CUAS developer has created the prototype, developer testing and evaluation (T&E) will be required prior to commercialization. This is usually the first "real" demonstration of the device outside of internal developer testing. This represents a major step forward, however, the device may still be composed of elements that are not optimally organized. 3) Post Prototype/Manufactured System -Once a CUAS developer has completed the R&D prototype phase, the system is now considered a manufactured system and therefore, third party validation testing is required. It is important that third party validation be performed for the entity utilizing the CUAS technology in order to make a risk based decision.
4) Approval for Use -Performing the T&E in this phase is important to reduce the risk of deployment, as well as, re-evaluation of significant enhancements prior to deployment. The additional T&E that may be performed in this phase includes degradation, vulnerability, and/or blackhatting. 5) Certification and Evaluation -Certification and Evaluation is important in order to try to detect any premature failures and latent defects in the equipment as well as assessing the adequacy of logistics support. Re-evaluation of significant enhancements should also occur in this phase prior to those upgrades being deployed. 6) Enhancements -After the certification and evaluation is completed, the threat will continue to change and new technologies will emerge, which will require enhancements to the existing CUAS technology. As these enhancements are introduced, the cycle continues in order to mature, evaluate, and certify those enhancements for deployment. The facility (or licensee) will need to redesign/upgrade the technology to correct noted inadequacies and re-evaluate to determine that the inadequacies are corrected. Re-evaluation should be done on a regular basis, as targets and threats change, both locally and globally.
B. CUAS T&E
Testing and evaluation is necessary to determine key performance characteristics which can be used in the traditional PPS design process. Because CUAS technologies are emerging and rapidly changing, a robust T&E process is required to keep pace.
Several challenges remain to be solved in the T&E domain: 1) Development of a general purpose graded T&E approachMethods are needed that enable unified, general purpose T&E of complex CUAS systems that may be composed on many unique subsystems. Development of key performance characteristics, test scenarios, and a graded approach that enables measuring relevant parameters in the most cost effective manner are active areas of investigation. 2) Characterization of autonomy within CUAS and effective test methodologies-Due to the likely use of multiphenomenology sensing subsystems within the greater CUAS device, the use of autonomous elements should be anticipated in near-future CUAS solutions. Technical experts and policy specialist will need to work together to re-evaluate if traditional sensing metrics used in the PPS are meaningful in systems with autonomous components between the human and raw sensed data. Additionally, quantitative analysis regarding how these autonomous components impact the ultimate human operator will enable more effective use of the CUAS device.
3) The role of cyber security-CUAS devices typically consist of many subsystems which are generally controlled by a computing device. In order to have the greatest confidence in the PPS, CUAS devices should be analyzed from a cyber security perspective in addition to more traditional T&E that characterizes system performance.
V. DESIGNING THE PPS The 'detect-delay-response' paradigm used in the DEPO process is predicated on the fact that a site is considered secure when the PPS is shown capable of detecting the adversary attack early enough and delaying the adversary long enough to allow the security to interrupt and neutralize the threat [2] . Unique pressures are applied to this process due to the nature of UAS and associated CUAS elements.
A. Detection & Assessment
Early detection and identification is the key to effective neutralization of the UAS threat [14] . In order to discover an adversary action the following events must occur [2] .
1) A sensor reacts to a stimulus and initiates an alarm.
2) The information from the sensor and assessment subsystems is reported and displayed to a security operator. 3) A person assesses information and judges the alarm to be valid or invalid. UAS are highly maneuverable, small, fast, and increasingly autonomous. With the expanding technological capabilities of UAS, multiple types of detection capabilities will need to be leveraged including visible and infrared imagers, radar, acoustic emissions, electromagnetic emissions, and/or induced magnetic fields [15] . Quantitative understanding of how multiphenomenology systems improve UAS detection and assessment are needed. Importantly, the impact of these diverse information types on the role of the human operator should not be forgotten, and robust human factors analysis should be conducted to assure that operators remain effective.
B. Delay
In a PPS, delay is defined as the slowing down of adversary progress after detection. This is where traditional PPS and a CUAS PPS differ most significantly. With the current state of technology there are minimal delay options for UAS delay and no apparent options to delay from entry within a site's three dimensional boundary. Currently, CUAS efforts focus on longer-distance detection to mitigate this lack of delay. The earlier a UAS is detected with long-range sensors, the more time there is available for response capabilities to address the threat.
C. Response & Neutralization
The broad definition for response and neutralization is denial of mission, including destruction of the UAS target [15] . Non-destructive response to a CUAS threat would serve the purpose of neutralizing the threat, but would also aid in the investigation of the source of the threat and conducting forensics analysis. In general, non-destructive response options are relatively slow and require a longer response time, which could be problematic in a case of a fast attack. Alternatively, destroying the UAS would prevent successful completion of the adversaries mission, but could results in difficulties finding the adversary operator [14] .
VI. ANALYSIS
The PPS is a complex configuration of security elements, an analysis should be performed on the PPS to evaluate the effectiveness of the design. The goal of the UAS threat is to complete a path to a target with the least likelihood of being detected or neutralized by the CUAS technology. The measure of effectiveness for neutralizing an adversary is dependent on timely detection. In order to effectively analysis the purposed CUAS design, the analysis will leverage the CUAS T&E performance metrics results to verify the design meets the requirements outlined in the DBT prior to implementation.
VII. CONCLUSION
With the rise of consumer UAS and the limited technical background necessary to utilize these systems, a new security concern is realized. This paper highlights the challenges to the traditional physical security framework when a new kind of threat is introduced. With the wide range of threats created by UAS, all new and innovative CUAS must be tested and challenged before being added into existing PPS. We have presented a comprehensive methodology to define the threat, design the PPS, select the CUAS technology, identify the capability gaps, expose associated risks via analysis, and provide a comparative, repeatable and quantifiable methodology to implementing this emerging technology.
